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                                                      Abstract 
                                                          
This paper, from a historical perspective, questions the thesis (again in fashion) that 
price flexibility ensures full employment. The point is made that explanation of 
unemployment in terms of wage/price stickiness typified pre-Keynesian accounts, 
but not Keynes’s theory of involuntary unemployment. Under uncertainty, no set of 
prices consistent with full employment may actually exist: if so, price flexibility is 
not the critical factor. Finally, with respect to current use of the “AD/AS model”, we 
note that the strong arguments against attribution of necessarily beneficient effects to 
price and wage flexibility, which ought to be well-known, seem now to be forgotten. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  I am grateful to Rod Cross for comment on an earlier draft of this paper; he is of course in no way 
responsible for remaining deficiencies. 
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Introduction 
 
At the present time, standard macro textbooks are wont to convey the view that the natural state 
of the economy is one of full employment, and that unemployment, when it occurs, can be 
considered a temporary, disequilibrium phenomenon resulting from stickiness of prices and 
consequent slowness of the market mechanism in performing its equilibrating role. It is taken for 
granted that any upsetting impact of demand disturbances on output and employment will in time 
be eliminated as the price mechanism “grinds out” the appropriate set of relative values. With 
respect to the history of economic analysis, the reader is given to understand that Keynes’s 
contribution to macro theory was to direct attention to the disequilibrium conditions of the short 
run, thereby complementing the traditional (“classical”) theory which was concerned primarily 
with the long-run equilibrium state of the system. 
 
Take a couple of instances of such textbook pronouncements. One refers to stickiness of relative 
prices, and the other to inflexibility of the general price level; both associate the Keynesian 
tradition with non-adjustment of prices, and both associate the persistence of unemployment 
with inadequate price adjustment. 
 
The classical supply curve is based on the belief that the labour market works smoothly, always 
maintaining full employment of the labour force. Movements in the wage are the mechanism through 
which full employment is maintained. The Keynesian aggregate supply curve is instead based on the 
assumption that the wage does not change much or at all when there is unemployment, and thus that 
unemployment can continue for some time . . .   
                                                                                                                         (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1990, p.225) 
 
We can now see the key difference between the Keynesian and classical approaches to the 
determination of national income. The Keynesian assumption . . . is that the price level is stuck . . . The 
classical assumption is that the price level is flexible . . .  The price level adjusts to ensure that national 
income is always at the natural rate. The classical assumption best describes the long run . . . The 
Keynesian assumption best describes the short. 
                                                                                                                                 (Mankiw, 1994, p.275) 
The fact that such views can be asserted even today suggests, on the part of their proponents, a 
lack of familiarity with the course of development of macroeconomic theory; in particular it 
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gives reason to suspect deficiency in understanding of the powerful arguments which cast doubt 
on the thesis that price flexibility guarantees full employment. We believe that a review of how 
thinking on this important issue has evolved may point to a different conception which, from the 
perspective of mainstream modern macroeconomics, seems all too frequently overlooked or 
forgotten. The purpose of this paper is therefore to put before the reader a less comfortable 
interpretation of the working of the macro system which calls in question the validity of the 
fashionable presumption that, as far as full employment is concerned, it is all a matter of “getting 
prices right”. 
 
The old classical orthodoxy 
 
To get our bearings, we begin by going back to the earliest debates as to the cause of 
unemployment in the (then emerging) industrial economy. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, amongst those with an interest in economic affairs, controversy broke out over what we 
would now regard as a question of macroeconomic stability. The issue was the possibility of a 
general “glut” - of the occurrence of a state of affairs characterised by general overproduction 
relative to demand for output, accompanied by widespread unemployment. 
 
Proponents of what become the orthodox view (Say, James Mill, Ricardo and J. S. Mill) held 
that no general deficiency of planned demand relative to productive capacity could ever occur. 
These authorities did not in fact focus on price flexibility as the key to full employment: their 
position was rather that a macroeconomic problem of insufficient demand was simply 
inconceivable. They were absolutely confident that the fear of the “heretics” (e.g. Malthus, 
Chalmers and Sismondi) of “too much” investment causing such expansion of productive 
capacity as to outrun the growth of demand, was totally without foundation either in theory or in 
fact. While it was of course recognised that oversupply of any particular commodity could occur, 
a general state of overproduction across the economy, on account of want of planned demand, 
was deemed impossible. 
 
Advocates of this position cited “Say’s Law” - the proposition that the very act of supplying 
goods to the market implies a corresponding volume of demand - arguing that a producer was 
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desirous either of consuming his own product or of exchanging it for the products of others. 
Essentially, the view was that the desire to purchase could not fail to keep up with the volume of 
goods produced; even if savings were made out of current income, such saving would 
automatically be matched by planned investment. Thus, from the orthodox perspective, the 
understanding was simply that, in the natural course of events, demand would grow along with 
capacity. Orthodox theorists did not admit the possibility of an autonomously-occurring want of 
demand and so did not think in terms of price adjustment as providing a solution. 
 
The neoclassical version  
 
While the political economy of the old classical economists had been primarily concerned with 
questions concerning the nature, causes and process of economic growth, the neoclassical or 
marginalist economics which came to dominate the scene towards the end of the nineteenth 
century concentrated much more narrowly on the optimising behaviour of individual agents. The 
defining characteristic of marginalist theory is to represent economic problems as issues of 
optimal choice. This approach resulted from the deliberate application of mathematical reasoning 
to economic analysis - bringing to economic theory the notions of marginal increments and 
optimisation through marginal adjustment. Individual agents within the economy, be they 
consumers or producers, are depicted as engaging in acts of rational choice, balancing marginal 
benefit against marginal cost. The activities of these rational optimisers are understood to be co-
ordinated through the price mechanism. Markets are presumed to clear, establishing an 
equilibrium state from which, in the given circumstances, no one has any incentive to depart. 
The marginalist analysis is thus focused on the attainment of equilibrium through the working of 
the market mechanism; correspondingly, the solution of a problem - the elimination of some 
disequilibrium situation - is characteristically envisaged in terms of “getting prices right”.  
 
At least until the inter-war years neoclassical economists, concentrating on supply and demand 
and microeconomic matters, gave relatively little attention to macroeconomic issues (though in 
the 1920s and 1930s intensive debate on macro matters did develop). With respect to the 
employment issue, the Ricardian contention that an autonomously occurring deficiency of 
aggregate demand was not to be feared was carried through into the new era. The argument was 
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however now developed with a neoclassical twist. The rationalisation brought forward to justify 
the thesis that the value of planned demand naturally tends to equality with the value of output 
produced was that it is the proper functioning of the price mechanism which ensures equality of 
planned investment with savings out of full employment income. Specifically, it was held that the 
rate of interest served to equate savings and planned investment. Establishment of the “natural” 
rate of interest would ensure equilibrium in the savings-investment (loanable funds) market, 
guaranteeing the recirculation as effective demand for output of whatever portion of current 
income was reserved as savings. In that situation saving becomes equivalent to consumption as a 
source of demand.  Keynes (1936, p.19) quotes Marshall to that effect: 
 
The whole of a man’s income is expended in the purchase of services and of commodities. It is  indeed 
commonly said that a man spends some portion of his income and saves another. But it is a familiar 
economic axiom that a man purchases labour and commodities with that portion of his income which he 
saves just as much as he does with that he is said to spend. He is said to spend when he seeks to obtain 
present enjoyment from the services and commodities which he  purchases. He is said to save when he 
causes the labour and commodities which he purchases to be devoted to the production of wealth from 
which he expects to derive the means of enjoyment in the future. 
 
Thus, in the neoclassical era, as had not been the case in classical times, the balancing of savings 
and investment was recognised as potentially problematical, but it was believed that the efficient 
operation of the price mechanism - in the form of the “interest rate mechanism” - would 
(eventually) resolve any problem which might arise. It was accepted however that this 
mechanism did not work with perfect efficiency. Neoclassical writers (e.g. Wicksell, Pigou, D. 
H. Robertson, and the early Keynes) held that slow operation of the interest rate mechanism 
permitted short-term variations in employment and output. If, for instance, a change was 
perceived in investment prospects, the natural rate would alter to maintain equality between 
savings and investment. The trouble was that the actual rate which obtained in the market, and to 
which agents responded, was the “money” rate as set by the banks; if the banks were slow in 
adjusting their rate to the change in investment conditions, the money rate would fail to move 
with the natural rate, resulting in an excess or deficiency of investment spending above or below 
savings. The understanding was that, if the money rate happened to fall short of the natural rate, 
the excess of intended investment over savings would induce increased bank lending; 
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alternatively, if the money rate was too high, and savings exceeded investment, the money 
supply would fall. Spending would vary with changes in the quantity of money. What happened 
next, following an increase or decrease in spending, would depend on the degree of money wage 
and price flexibility. If, with full flexibility, all money values responded immediately and 
proportionately to the monetary change, the price level would alter without any impact on output 
and employment. But if, as was considered the more likely outcome, commodity prices altered 
more quickly than money wages, real wages would be affected, resulting in changes in 
employment and output. In time, of course, once the money rate caught up with the natural rate 
and real wages were restored to their “proper” value, activity would return to its normal level. 
The cyclical unemployment associated with such a sequence of events could be classified as 
frictional. 
 
In the inter-war period, however, it became evident to Professor Pigou that the abnormally high 
and prolonged unemployment then being suffered in Britain represented something other than 
the regular fluctuations of the trade cycle as experienced in earlier years. Temporary 
malfunctioning of the interest rate mechanism did not seem enough to account for the current 
problem of persisting unemployment. But Pigou still interpreted the situation as a problem with 
prices - specifically the price of labour services. His diagnosis (presented in his 1933 Theory of 
Unemployment) was that the distressing contemporary situation could be understood only as the 
result of an unduly high level of real wages; Pigou (1933, p.256) surmised that, after the 
dramatic changes in prices and money wages during the war and immediate post-war years, the 
level of money wages had got “stuck” in an inappropriate relationship to the level of commodity 
prices. 
 
Since the post-Armistice boom, however, the unemployment situation has been very different from 
what it was before the war.  Instead of a percentage of  unemployment amounting, on the average of 
good and bad years, to some 41/2 per cent, post-war unemployment has moved from a mean from  twice  
to three times as large as this. This circumstance  suggests  strongly  that  the goal of long-run 
tendencies in recent times has been a wage level substantially above that proper to nil unemployment,  
and  that a substantial part of post-war unemployment is attributable to that fact. 
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In other words, workers, maintaining the going level of money wages, were pricing themselves 
out of employment. The consequent unemployment could be described as being, in effect, 
“voluntary”. The remedy proposed was, in modern parlance, “to get prices right” by engineering 
a cut in real wages. Pigou, apparently taking it for granted that the interest rate mechanism 
would, in principle, ensure equality of planned spending with the value of output produced (i.e. 
tacitly subscribing to Say’s Law) was confident that employment would then increase as, with 
lower wages, firms would move down their “labour demand” (marginal product of labour) 
schedules. 
 
As to the practicability of this strategy, much careful assessment of production conditions led 
Pigou (1933, p.106) to the conclusion that what he called the “real demand function for labour” 
was fairly elastic, implying that no very great reduction in real wages was required to boost 
employment to a satisfactory level. 
  
 . . . we may, therefore, not unreasonably put the elasticity of the money demand for labour in times of 
deep depression at not less numerically than  -1.5.  . . . We have thus margin enough for a fairly 
confident claim that, in times of deep depression, after an interval not less than the period of production 
of the generality of wage-goods and export goods, an all-round cut of 10 per cent in money rates of 
wages1 would lead, other things being equal, to a more than 10 per cent expansion in the aggregate 
volume of labour demanded, and so, apart from unfilled vacancies, in the volume of employment     
 
It was specifically on Pigou’s Theory of Unemployment, and his diagnosis that the root of the 
trouble lay in the labour market - stickiness of real wages being responsible for the persisting 
high unemployment of the period - that Keynes set his sights as constituting the fullest and most 
explicit statement of what he understood to be the “classical” position. 
 
The Keynes theory 
 
                                                 
1
  It should be emphasised here that Pigou of course held that employment was a function of the real wage; in 
keeping with that understanding, by this stage in his argument he had already attempted to take into account in his 
calculations “what changes in real rates of wages are implied by given changes in money wages”; vide: The Theory 
of Unemployment, Part II, Chap. X. 
 8
By the mid-1930s Keynes had eventually arrived, in his own mind, at an understanding of what 
was wrong with the traditional approach and what was needed in its place. As Keynes saw the 
situation, the classical theory failed to engage with the real world conditions of the time – it 
failed to provide a believable explanation of the major contemporary economic problem, that of 
high and persistent unemployment: the classical theory was, in his opinion, incapable of 
comprehending the true nature of the problem: 
 
In addition to “frictional” unemployment, (the classical theory) is also compatible with “voluntary”  
unemployment due to the refusal or inability of a unit of labour,  as a result of legislation or social 
practices or of combination for collective bargaining or of slow response to change  or  of  mere  human  
obstinacy,  to accept a reward corresponding to the value of the product attributable to its marginal 
productivity. But these two categories of “frictional” unemployment and “voluntary” unemployment are 
comprehensive. The classical postulates do not admit of the possibility of the third category which I 
shall define . . . as “involuntary” unemployment.2           
                                                                                                                                    (Keynes, 1936, p.6)                                     
 
Keynes’s explanation of the occurrence of involuntary unemployment depended on his 
identifying aggregate demand for output, not conditions of labour supply, as the key determinant 
of levels of output and employment within the economy. Aggregate demand was no longer 
treated as a “tame” variable, ultimately tied to the value of output supplied. If there happened to 
be insufficient demand within the system to justify full employment, workers would find 
themselves, against their wishes, out of a job, even if the terms on which they sought work were 
perfectly compatible with their employment under other conditions of demand. The problem was 
not, as Pigou viewed it, one of wages being stuck at an inappropriate real level, but one of 
insufficient planned demand for output. 
                                                 
2
 Keynes’s famously obscure definition of involuntary unemployment (1936, p.15) reads thus: “Men are 
involuntarily unemployed if, in the event of a small rise in the price of wage-goods relatively to the money wage, 
both the aggregate supply of labour willing to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate demand for it at 
that wage would be greater than the existing volume of employment”. Suffice it to say here, the essential point is 
that (in terms of the labour-market diagram) Keynes envisages, with deficient demand and unemployment, a 
difference (diagramatically, a gap) existing, at the going full-employment rate of wages, between the quantity of 
labour available for employment and the quantity actually demanded by employers; the fact that labour is “off its 
supply curve” is indicative of the involuntary nature of that unemployment.  
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 Keynes rejected both the rationalisations previously offered for not worrying about the adequacy 
of aggregate demand. He saw demand as independent of supply, as an unstable and unreliable 
factor reflecting the expenditure plans of consumers and investors: there was no guarantee, as 
old authorities such as Ricardo and J S Mill had supposed, that the very act of production 
implied demand - that the value of planned expenditures would naturally and automatically 
match the value of output produced. Neither, Keynes argued, could reliance be placed on the 
neoclassical notion of the “interest rate mechanism”: according to his new theory of liquidity 
preference, the role of the rate of interest (a monetary, not a “real” phenomenon) was to 
reconcile asset preferences and demands in the financial markets, and not to equate the value of 
spending on new capital goods with the value of saving. [We can add that the neoclassical 
“productivity and thrift” treatment of interest as equating the demand and supply of (new) 
“capital” is undermined by the “Cambridge critique” which demonstrates that to attempt to 
explain in these terms the rate of interest (“the price of capital”), as equal to the marginal product 
of capital, is logically incoherent.] 
 
Keynes considered carefully the question of whether wage and price flexibility would help to get 
the economy out of a demand-deficient state of slump. From his perspective, any mechanism to 
counter unemployment would have to work via a stimulus to demand: he concluded that neither 
real wage reductions (even if such could be achieved), nor falling money wages and prices, 
would help; either would probably make the situation worse.3 The economy could not be 
                                                 
3
  Keynes favoured price stability, rather than downward price flexibility, as preferable in slump conditions. Thus 
(1936, pp.269-70): “It follows, therefore, that if labour were to respond to conditions of gradually diminishing 
employment by offering its services at a gradually diminishing money-wage, this would not, as a rule, have the 
effect of reducing real wages and might even have the effect of increasing them, through its adverse influence on 
the volume of output. The chief result of this policy would be to cause a great instability of prices, so violent  
perhaps as to make business calculations futile in an economic society functioning after the manner of that in which 
we live. To suppose that a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is one 
of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. . . . In the light of these considerations I am now of the opinion that the 
maintenance of a stable general level of money-wages is, on a balance of considerations, the most advisable policy 
for a closed system; whilst the same conclusion will hold good for an open system, provided that equilibrium with 
the rest of the world can be secured by means of fluctuating exchanges. There are advantages in some degree of 
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regarded as possessing a reliable “self-righting” capability: government intervention, possibly in 
the role of “pump-priming”, was indicated as necessary to get things moving. 
 
Fundamental to Keynes’s “general theory” is his appreciation that the economy exists and 
functions within real historical time, that wealth-seeking agents must necessarily make decisions 
respecting asset choice under conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty, as faced by decision-
makers in the real world, cannot always be reduced to calculable, and insurable risk. Thus 
Keynes (1937), differentiating his conception of the situation from that of the “classics” (present 
and past), argued that his contemporaries, 
 
 . . . like their predecessors, were dealing with a system in which the amount of the factors employed 
was   given and other relevant facts were known more or less for certain. This does not mean that they 
were dealing with a system in which change was ruled out, or even one in which the disappointment of 
expectation was ruled out. But, at any given time, facts and expectations were assumed to be given in a 
definite and calculable form, and risks, of which, though  admitted, no much notice was taken, were 
supposed to be capable of exact actuarial computation. The calculus of probability, though kept in the 
background, was supposed to be capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as 
certainty itself; 
 
And he goes on to charge “classical” economic theory with being 
 
 . . . one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the 
fact that we know very little about the future. 
     
That the General Theory is macroeconomics for a world of uncertainty is evident from the 
importance Keynes attributes to expectations and states of confidence as affecting the behaviour 
of decision makers, as regards both choice amongst financial assets and the purchase of 
produced commodities. The fact that decisions have to be made without decision-makers being 
                                                                                                                                                       
flexibility in the wages of particular industries so as to expedite transfers from those which are relatively declining 
to those which are relatively expanding. But the money-wage level as a whole should be maintained as stable as 
possible, at any rate in the short period.”  
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sure of the eventual outcome is central to Keynes’s vision of the working of the system: the 
economy is viewed not as a closed mechanical system, but as one which is “open-ended” in that 
there can never exist a complete set of markets such that all risks and uncertainties are 
eliminated by insurance; hopes and fears, imagination and guess-work cannot in the real world 
be excluded as determining factors in the working of the economic system.  
 
In the view of the present writer, there is no doubt that Keynes’s General Theory was a truly 
“revolutionary” contribution.4 In rejecting interest and wage stickiness explanations of 
unemployment, and in identifying aggregate demand, which under uncertainty is dependent on 
expectations and confidence, as the key determining factor, Keynes was indeed making a clear 
break with received doctrines. The question, however, for historians of economic thought is why 
mainstream macro theory has in recent times managed so effectively to ignore that break and 
return to an essentially pre-Keynesian conception of the working of the macro system. 
 
After Keynes  
 
The Keynesian theory pretty quickly became established (at least for the next thirty plus years) 
as the new orthodoxy: a completely novel body of economic analysis - modern macroeconomics 
- developed. Prominent in this new literature was the Hicks-Hansen IS/LM model which, 
integrating the income-expenditure and monetary elements of Keynes’s system in a convenient 
diagram, was generally accepted as satisfactorily representing the essentials of the Keynesian 
conception. Until the late 1960s, Keynesian theory, although not unchallenged, formed the basis 
of mainstream macroeconomics.  
 
What challenges to mainstream Keynesian orthodoxy that there were in the early years, although 
coming from sometimes hostile traditionalists, nevertheless implied acceptance of the essential 
Keynes proposition that aggregate demand was what mattered with respect to the determination 
of output and employment. The fact that attention was directed to the determination of demand 
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rather than, as in previous times, to the level of real wages or to disparity between the “natural” 
and money rates of interest, indicated just how generally and profoundly thinking had been 
changed by the publication of the General Theory. 
 
One line of criticism built on the notion of the “wealth” or “Pigou effect” as providing a possible 
automatic rescue-mechanism - the existence of which Keynes had denied - for an economy sunk 
in heavy unemployment. The argument was that lower prices would increase the real value of the 
nominal money stock, thus generating a positive wealth effect on household spending; if, the 
argument went, prices could fall far enough, then aggregate demand would be boosted to full 
employment level, regardless of any liquidity trap or of interest inelasticity of investment 
demand. It was however explicitly recognised by theorists who explored this real-balance route 
(Pigou himself, Patinkin - not to mention Keynes) that the weakness of the wealth effect on 
consumption, and even more importantly, the negative effects on demand likely to result from a 
process of deflation, ruled the real balance effect out of court as a practical equilibrating 
mechanism.5 It was agreed that downward adjustment of money wages in a depression might 
well make things worse rather than better. While Patinkin emphasised that, from the Walrasian 
perspective, the dynamic complications of a deflationary process implied a critical question 
about the stability of equilibrium, it is probably fair to say that, all too often, Patinkin’s caveat 
about the attainability of equilibrium was ignored and replaced by a facile presumption that price 
flexibility was enough to ensure full employment. 
 
A different line of attack on mainstream Keynesianism came from Milton Friedman and the 
Chicago School who argued, on the basis of alleged empirical evidence, that the macro economy 
                                                                                                                                                       
4
 In a recent study Laidler (1999) has however argued that the development of macro theory in the 1930s along 
Keynesian lines should be viewed as being of an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, character. That assessment 
is disputed in Grieve (2001).  
5
 We may quote Patinkin (1959, pp.582-87) on this: “The automatic adjustment process of the market is too 
unreliable to serve as the practical basis of a full-employment policy. In other words, though the real balance effect 
must be taken account of in our theoretical analysis, it is too weak - and, in some cases (due to adverse expectations) 
too perverse - to fulfil a significant role in our policy considerations”. 
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was much more stable than suggested by Keynes, and that fluctuations in demand and activity 
were attributable to (avoidable) changes in the money supply, rather than to autonomous 
variations in the volume of aggregate demand. But again, it is noteworthy that, although 
Friedman was denying the destabilising effects of changes in confidence and expectations central 
to Keynes’s vision, the argument was nevertheless about the determination, as the key factor, of 
aggregate demand. 
 
Walrasian macroeconomics 
 
Keynes’s understanding that the elimination of unemployment is not simply a matter of “getting 
prices right” can - perhaps surprisingly - be supported by consideration of what we may call 
“Walrasian macroeconomics”. Over the last seventy years the Walrasian general equilibrium 
model has been adopted by neoclassical theorists as the most appropriate conceptualisation and 
representation of the economic system. The neoclassical synthesis of the 1950s and 1960s was 
an attempt to combine Keynesian and Walrasian contributions; the simplified macroeconomic 
version of the Walrasian system employed in Patinkin’s (1965) Money, Interest and Prices 
exemplifies this approach. Let us make use of such a model, employing it specifically to shed 
light on the question of whether the attainment and maintenance of full employment is in fact a 
matter of “getting prices right”. 
 
First of all, recall the nature of the Walrasian general equilibrium model. The Walrasian model 
shows the economy as a system of inter-related markets, this system being represented by a set 
of simultaneous equations which state the conditions to be satisfied for equilibrium - demand 
equal to supply, or excess demand equal to zero in each market. Excess demand in each market 
is taken to be a function of the price in that market and of all other prices. Two questions are 
posed: does a set of prices exist which yields simultaneous equilibrium in all markets (the issue 
of the existence of equilibrium)? And, secondly, if such a set of equilibrium prices does exist, 
will the market mechanism succeed in establishing these prices (the issue of the stability of 
equilibrium)? 
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Take a very simple illustration of the nature of the general equilibrium model. Suppose there are 
n goods traded within an economy - specifically 5 goods (in reality there would of course be 
thousands) - goods a, b, c, d and e. If we take one of these as the numeraire and set the price of 
one unit of that good at unity (Pe, say, equals 1), there are then n - 1 (4) relative prices - Pa, Pb, 
Pc and Pd in terms of good e - to be determined. There are at the same time n (5) equilibrium 
conditions (n XD equations) to be satisfied. It might at first sight appear that we have more 
determining equations than unknowns (5 as against 4). In fact, by “Walras’ Law” we actually 
have only n - 1 (4) independent excess demand equations - the same number of equations as 
unknowns. Conventionally we take it that, with equality in number of unknowns and 
independent determining conditions, it is reasonable to suppose that a solution - a set of prices 
which yields market-clearing equilibrium - exists.6
 
Let us now reformulate this simple model as a macro model.7 Again suppose that there are 5 
markets within the system - but now assume that these are markets for consumption goods (C), 
capital goods (K), labour (L), bonds (B) and money (M). It is assumed that the given stock of 
money consists of a certain number of nominal units. Taking money as the numeraire, the 
unknowns are 4 relative prices (of C, K, L and B) expressed in terms of money. (When these 4 
                                                 
6
  As equality of unknowns and independent equations does not in fact guarantee a solution, “we have to abandon 
the confidence of Walras for the much less certain hope that there is a unique solution”. (Johnson, 1971, p.103) That 
is certainly the usual procedure; thus Patinkin (1965, p.37): “Now, equality between the number of unknowns and 
the number of independent equations is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of a solution. 
Nor does it ensure that solutions, if they do exist, will be only finite in number. For our purposes, however, these 
highly complicated issues can be ignored. Instead, we shall accept such equality as justifying the reasonableness of 
the assumption that one and the same [unique] set of money prices can simultaneously create equilibrium in each 
and every market.”    
7
  Note Weintraub (1974, p.15): “In a real sense, macroeconomics is general equilibrium theory with some of the 
many markets grouped together for expositional clarity and convenience. In a general equilibrium schema of about 
80,000 markets describing the behaviour of all prices in an economy, perhaps the first 40,000 markets are for 
consumer goods, the next 20,000 for capital goods, with 10,000 for labour services, 10,000 for financial assets, and 
a few for money. Combining markets for similar goods there is ‘merely’ the problem of five markets: consumer 
goods, investment goods, labour services, financial assets, and money.” 
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prices are specified the value of the money supply in terms of goods - M/P - is implied.8) To 
determine the 4 unknowns, there are, by Walras’ Law, 4 independent excess demand equations 
amongst the 5 excess demand equations of the system. Thus we may conclude that it is 
reasonable to suppose the existence of an equilibrium set of prices. (Furthermore, and again 
following convention, we may suppose that the price mechanism works in such a way as to 
establish that set of prices if equilibrium has for any reason been disturbed.) Thus, the model we 
have here is, in conventional neoclassical terms, read as representing a macro system in which 
price adjustments should be capable of establishing full employment equilibrium. If this is taken 
as a parable with something to say about the real world, the moral would seem to be that, with a 
properly functioning price system, i.e. with flexible prices, full employment may be regarded as 
the natural state of the economy.  The corollary of that is, of course, that persistent 
disequilibrium - persisting unemployment - would be attributable to inflexibility of prices. 
 
The above model - employing the Walrasian conception in the macro context - simple though it 
is, essentially represents the neoclassical view of the functioning of the macroeconomic system. 
That is the conception of things which underlies the almost universal textbook assertion that the 
Keynesian explanation of unemployment must reside in price rigidity, that underlies the New 
Classical and Rational Expectations accounts of (what are said to be at most) temporary 
deviations from the Natural Rate of Unemployment, and indeed underlies the concern of the (so-
called) “New Keynesian” school with the causes of price stickiness or price rigidity. All these 
several varieties of macroeconomic theorising share the characteristic neoclassical belief - 
perhaps “faith” would be a better word - that the achievement of full employment equilibrium is 
a matter of “getting prices right”. But is it? 
 
Consider again our simple Walrasian macro model and imagine that initially the situation is one 
of full utilisation of production capacity and full employment. Now suppose there occurs a fall in 
the demand for capital goods. If demand remains low, producers in that sector will reduce 
production and cut employment and, as incomes fall, the recession is transmitted via the 
                                                 
8
  It is assumed that there is a demand for real money balances (M/P) and that the price level (P) is specified in terms 
of the prices of a particular basket of goods. 
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multiplier process throughout the economy. In terms of the IS/LM model the IS curve (and 
possibly the LM curve as well) has moved to the left and the economy settles to a new 
equilibrium with production adjusted to the reduced level of aggregate demand and less labour 
employed than is available. The sum of excess demands is then less than zero: demand equals 
supply in the goods and asset markets, but supply exceeds demand in the labour market. 
 
This condition of net excess supply poses a theoretical problem: by Walras’ Law that state of 
affairs is an impossibility - the sum of excess demands ought to equal zero. If, in the C, K, B and 
M markets excess demand is zero, then, according to Walras’ Law, demand and supply must be 
equal in the remaining market - i.e. there must be full equilibrium in the labour market. The logic 
of the conventional analysis rules out the occurrence of this situation of depression equilibrium - 
the existence of an excess supply of labour should necessarily imply the simultaneous existence 
of an equal value of excess demand for goods or securities which would directly or indirectly 
justify increased production. But in reality we can readily envisage such “slump conditions” in 
which labour is unemployed while demand equals supply everywhere else in the system. Walras’ 
Law evidently doesn’t square with that perception. 
 
This is the point picked up by Robert Clower (1965) and Axel Leijonhufvud (1968) thirty odd 
years ago when attempting to capture the essence of Keynes’s general theory within the 
Walrasian framework. Clower’s explanation of the possible emergence of a net excess supply of 
labour - contradicting the prediction of Walras’ Law - was that in a money-using economy 
planned or “notional” demand will not become “effective” demand if, because of lack of access 
to means of payment, agents are unable to express their intended demand on the market. In 
Clower’s example unemployed labour has an unsatisfied demand for commodities but, with sales 
of labour services constrained and a consequent want of current income, does not have the 
necessary means of payment to make its demand effective. If, as in the Clower illustration, the 
real wage is stuck at too high a level, there exists simultaneously an excess supply of labour and 
a (notional) excess demand for goods, but without any actual pressure of demand in the goods 
market to raise prices relatively to money wages. The conclusion reached was that, under 
disequilibrium conditions, Walras’ Law does not hold good: while it is true that taking notional 
and effective excess demands together the sum of excess demands does equal zero, with respect 
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to effective demand alone as actually expressed in the market, the general case is that sum of 
excess demands is, at most, equal to zero. With disequilibrium, net effective excess demand can 
be negative. Thus, it would appear, the conventional Walrasian model fails to comprehend the 
constraint on effective demand which exists in the circumstances of Keynesian 
“underemployment equilibrium”.  
 
On that basis, recognition of the possibility of negative net excess demand (net excess supply) 
emerging within the economic system was taken by Clower to be the crucial feature which 
differentiates Keynes’s theory from conventional neoclassical theory. Clower argued that, even 
though Keynes framed his analysis in Marshallian rather than Walrasian terms, that in effect was 
the proposition he was advancing - that total excess demand within the economy did not 
necessarily sum to zero, implying that, with unemployment, the potential equilibrating force of 
positive excess demand need not in fact be operating to propel relative values towards a 
configuration consistent with full employment equilibrium.9
 
What do we make of this interpretation of the nature of Keynes’s theoretical innovation? As we 
read it, Clower did not get to the root of the matter: he seems to have focused on a symptom 
rather than on the cause of depression conditions as understood by Keynes. What Clower has 
formally identified - in terms of Walrasian theory - is simply the multiplier phenomenon, which 
derives from the fact that if labour is thrown out of work, purchasing power is reduced and 
workers’ effective demand for goods and services is thereby constrained. The Clower reading of 
Keynes has nothing to say about the cause of such a state of affairs - there is no consideration 
whatever of the reason why, in the first place, workers may have been laid off by their 
employers. The fact that the remedy as envisaged by Clower – a reduction of real wages - is the 
                                                 
9
  As Clower (1965) puts it: “Like us, Keynes does not in any way deny the generality of orthodox equilibrium 
analysis; he only denies that orthodox economics provides an adequate account of disequilibrium phenomena.” And 
further: “I shall argue that the established theory of household behaviour is, indeed, incompatible with Keynesian 
economics, that Keynes himself made tacit use of a more general theory, that this more general theory leads to 
market excess-demand functions which include quantities as well as prices as independent variables and, except in 
conditions of full employment, the excess-demand functions so defined do not satisfy Walras’ Law. In short, I shall 
argue that there has been a fundamental misunderstanding of the formal basis of the Keynesian Revolution.” 
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same as that proposed by Pigou suggests that Clower had not, as he claimed, put his finger on the 
distinctive feature of Keynes’s analysis of unemployment. Clower may have introduced the 
Keynesian multiplier to the Walrasian system, but there is much more than the multiplier in the 
General Theory. 
 
The state of affairs envisaged by Clower – an economy stuck in unemployment because real 
wages are fixed too high for full employment – does in fact (whatever may have been intended) 
correspond to Pigou’s picture of unemployment equilibrium. If we consider how such a 
Pigouvian situation would appear in Walrasian terms, we shall find a pointer to how the 
Keynesian conception may more adequately be represented in these Walrasian terms. Pigou 
takes it for granted that when production is offered on the market, demand (temporary, frictional 
difficulties aside) must be sufficient to take up whatever output is produced by labour of which 
the marginal product does not fall short of the real wage. (That is certainly the implication of 
treating, a la Pigou, the labour market exactly as the market for any final commodity, with 
equilibrium determined at the point of intersection of the demand and supply curves.) By 
Walras’ Law, when (in equilibrium) the sum of excess demands equals zero, the situation in any 
one market of the economy can be inferred from the conditions prevailing in the rest of the 
system. Thus, if it happens to be the case (thinking of our 5 market model) that demand equals 
supply in the C, B, M and L markets (full employment), demand must also equal supply in the K 
market. From the Pigouvian perspective, so long as labour market conditions (specifically the 
terms of labour supply) remain unaltered, demand for output has to stay fixed at the full 
employment level. If, as Pigou represents the situation, employment is determined (ceteris 
paribus) in the labour market by conditions of labour supply, there is simply no room for an 
independent investment (K demand) function. 
 
The thesis we are about to develop as to how the Keynes theory should be interpreted in terms of 
the Walrasian framework, a thesis which questions not only the stability of equilibrium in the 
case of a multi-market economy, but raises doubt also regarding the existence of an equilibrium 
set of values, derives from the original and important, but regrettably neglected, contribution by 
the distinguished Japanese economist, Michio Morishima (Morishima, (1977). 
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We have noted that Clower’s attempt to connect the Keynesian and Walrasian models seems, 
though presumably that was not what was intended, to have landed us back in the theoretical 
conception of Professor Pigou. Let us see if we can find instead a Keynesian perspective. If, to 
break out of the Say’s Law world implicitly assumed by Pigou, we introduce an independent 
investment function into our 5 market Walrasian system, the situation is significantly altered. It 
can no longer be assumed that if conditions are as specified in the C, B, M and L markets, the 
state of affairs in the K market is also determinate: we are now allowing the K market to go its 
own way – for the demand for K goods to reflect investors’ views of the future, for their 
expectations and confidence to determine the orders placed, rather than for the volume of these 
orders automatically to correspond to the output available from the K goods industry.10 There is 
now an “un-tamed” aggregate investment function; consequently we now have 5 independent 
equilibrium conditions to determine the 4 unknowns (relative values) within the economy. The 
system is overdetermined. That being so, there may be no solution to be found by price 
adjustment; if the system is overdetermined and no equilibrium set of prices exists, no matter 
how flexible wages and prices may be, there is no guarantee that unemployment can be 
eliminated through the free functioning of the market mechanism.11 The root of the problem 
would lie not in imperfect working of the price mechanism, but in the existence of a fundamental 
                                                 
10
 Morishima (1977, p.95), observes that a “neoclassical full employment” situation is based on the assumption that 
“aggregate investment is perfectly flexible; that is to say the system lacks a non-trivial investment function, whereas 
it has a well-defined savings function. . . . It is really because of this lack of an investment function that investment 
can smoothly and quickly be adjusted to savings in our model and not vice versa. Such an economy, with perfectly 
flexible investment, is said to satisfy Say’s law. With this law, there is no obstacle to full employment equilibrium. 
It is indeed because of the premise of Say’s law that neoclassical economists could be confident of full employment 
equilibrium; therefore, it was a prime target of Keynes’ attack. In fact, he rejected the perfect flexibility of 
investment by introducing an investment function; then he found that the system was over-determined and full 
employment was not attainable.”  
11
 If it is “reasonable” to suppose that, with an equal number of independent equations and unknowns, that a 
solution exists, it may be correspondingly reasonable to doubt the existence of a solution when the number of 
independent equations exceeds the number of unknowns. “[If, with more equations than variables, the equations are 
linear and independent, they cannot be consistent.] If the equations are linear and inconsistent . . . then there is no 
solution. If the equations are not all linear, no general statement can be made.” From C F Christ, ‘An Aside on 
Counting Variables and Equations in Systems of Simultaneous Equations’, quoted by Johnson (1971), p.107.  
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inconsistency within the economy. The parameters of the system, that is to say, may be 
inconsistent: in economic terms it is perfectly feasible that current plans to sell labour services 
and current plans to purchase commodities, including the purchase of new producers’ goods, are 
are simply incompatible. 
 
Thus, freeing aggregate demand from the constraint of Say’s Law (as represented by the 
supposition of a “tame” investment function), we can no longer presume the existence of a 
solution in the form of a set of market-clearing prices – there need not be any set of prices at 
which all the conditions for equilibrium within the economy are simultaneously satisfied. Price 
flexibility is not then the key to the attainment of full employment equilibrium. What is critical is 
the consistency of the parameters, the state of which is variable. 
 
Morishima (1977, p.115-6) compares (in effect) the Pigouvian and Keynesian visions: 
 
Suppose . . . that Say’s Law is true. Then there exists a neoclassical full-employment, full-capacity 
equilibrium. Even in this case, if the wage is set [above the full-employment level], then no forces work 
to move the economy towards the equilibrium, because of the downwards rigidity of the wage rate. 
That is to say, the neoclassical equilibrium is prevented from prevailing in spite of its existence. If this 
were the case, we might ascribe the causes of unemployment to the downwards rigidity of wages and 
hence to the trade unions. Keynes, however, opposed this view; he believed that the neoclassical full-
employment, full-capacity equilibrium does not exist, because investment is determined independently 
of savings and, therefore, even if the wage is perfectly flexible, the economy cannot settle down at any 
point because of the overdeterminacy. Only the downwards rigidity stops this endless fluctuation, but is 
not the cause of under-employment because the removal of it will not lead to full employment. . . . 
Keynesian unemployment is the particular unemployment which corresponds to that level of savings 
which equals the level of investment independently determined. 
  
The reason why the investment demand function must (in a realistic context) be treated as 
independent is that investment decisions are – a central point of the Keynes theory – made under 
conditions of uncertainty. This means irreducible uncertainty, not risk such as can be covered by 
insurance. If the uncertainties respecting the returns to be got from investment could be 
eliminated by forward trading or insurance, then there would never be any case from holding 
back from investment so long as the physical conditions of production were capable of  yielding 
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profit. But if there is no way of ensuring that all possibilities of loss are excluded by making 
suitable arrangements, then investment must depend on the subjective factors  - expectations, 
confidence in these expectations, hopes and fears – that enter into the investor’s decision-
making. 
 
This is a point at which we come up against the fact that economics is, as Keynes regarded it, a 
“moral” science and not a natural science12: the investor’s decision is a human decision and 
should not be treated as link in a purely mechanical sequence whereby whatever resources are 
left aside from current use are automatically channelled to investment.     
 
Frank Hahn (1982), discussing the implications for the Walrasian general equilibrium system of 
allowing for uncertainty, makes in effect the same point – that in a Keynesian world, in which 
expectations play a critical role, the attainment of full equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. He 
points out that the existence of irreducible uncertainty means that a complete set of markets, such 
that the entrepreneur can eliminate all possibility of loss, will not exist. The consequences are 
serious: “if the invisible hand is to operate there must be sufficient opportunities for 
intertemporal and contingent intertemporal trade. . . . The lack of contingent markets means that 
the market economy is associated with more uncertainty than pure theory allows. The lack of 
intertemporal markets means that great weight must rest on market expectations.” In such 
circumstances the system is, rather than being completely interdependent, “open-ended” in that 
the outcome (the state of the economy) depends on subjective, essentially independent factors. 
Hahn remarks that “Keynes . . . placed great emphasis on the fact that he did not invoke [the 
complete markets postulate]”. 
 
                                                 
12
  Keynes (1973, p.300): “I want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science [and not a 
natural science]. I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and values. I might have added that it deals with 
motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as 
constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives, on 
whether it is worth falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken 
calculations on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth.” 
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The significance of our investigating in terms of the Walrasian framework the implications of the 
Keynes theory is that it becomes formally evident that in the case of a multi-market economic 
system operating in real world conditions of uncertainty, there can be no guarantee that in all 
circumstances an equilibrium solution (in the form of a market-clearing set of prices) actually 
exists. This finding confirms Keynes’s message that the degree of wage and price flexibility is 
not the critical factor to which attention should be directed in the analysis of unemployment. 
 
A non-Walrasian framework 
 
In order to deal with the conventional neoclassical wisdom on its own terms, we have discussed 
the issue of Say’s Law and overdeterminancy with reference to a Walrasian-type model. It would 
however be more appropriate to set the Keynesian argument within the framework of a classical 
(old-classical) model which is explicitly of a surplus-producing economic system. Using such a 
framework, the same point can be made that rejection of Say’s Law calls in question the 
presumption that full employment equilibrium can necessarily be achieved via price changes 
which establish a set of equilibrium prices implicit in the structure of the system. Consider the 
following illustration. 
 
Suppose that, in total, n goods and services - including intermediate goods, final consumption 
goods and investment goods - are produced within an economy, with output in excess of  what is 
required to replace everything, including the wages of the workforce, used up in the course of 
production. For equilibrium in the product markets, it is not enough simply that demand equals 
supply: quantities demanded and supplied must be such that long run equilibrium prices 
(classical “natural values”) obtain with prices which cover costs of production including profit at 
the going rate. Suppose that a certain supply of labour is offered for employment, and that the 
rate of real wages is determined by institutional factors at a conventional level. That wage must 
imply also, given the physical rate of surplus productivity, a determinate rate of realised profit at 
the full employment level of activity. Suppose too that money (a certain nominal supply being 
given) is used within the economy as the medium of exchange and a store of value and that 
lending and borrowing take place through trade in bonds on the financial (bond) market. We take 
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it that all wage income is automatically spent on consumption goods and that profits may, in 
principle, be saved or put to the acquisition of new investment goods. 
 
We assume first of all that Say’s Law applies and that a state of full employment equilibrium 
exists. Let us again count unknowns and independent equations. In the model thus specified, 
(with the predetermined rate of real wages, and taking money as the numeraire) there are  n + 3 
unknowns to be determined: n commodity prices in terms of money, the quantity of labour 
employed, the price of bonds and the rate of profit. To determine these unknowns we have one 
equation specifying (given the exogenously-determined real wage and the technologically-
determined wage-profit relationship) the return on capital invested, together with a set of 
simultaneous excess demand equations for n commodities (reflecting given conditions of 
production and demand), labour, bonds and money. If we take it that Walras’ Law applies to the 
system in equilibrium, this set of n + 3 equations contains (with agents’ spending constrained by 
income receipts and asset sales), n + 2 independent equations. Thus, counting the wage-profit 
equation, we have in total n + 3 independent equations to determine the n + 3 unknowns of the 
system.  
 
When full-employment is understood to exist there is no problem in accepting that if the (“nth”) 
equation rendered redundant by Walras’ Law is the (or an) excess demand equation for capital 
goods, equilibrium in the other markets implies simultaneous equilibrium in the deleted market. 
But if we drop the Say’s Law assumption that “tame” aggregate demand ensures full 
employment, we are in no position to know whether, everything else remaining unchanged, 
demand does or does not equal supply in that particular market. Without Say’s Law, Walras’s 
Law doesn’t apply either and the “nth” excess demand equation can no longer be considered 
redundant. Just as before, in terms of the Walrasian-type model, when we had equality of 
unknowns and independent determining equations, in this case we find again, when that 
condition is satisfied, that there is no room for an independent demand function or functions for 
capital goods. Thus again, if we abandon the assumption that aggregate demand is “tame”, and 
allow for investment spending being independent of labour market conditions, we must accept 
(at least) one other independent excess demand equation. When we do so, we have at least n + 4 
independent equations to determine the n + 3 unknowns of the system. The system is thus 
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overdetermined: it cannot be assumed that attainment of equilibrium is simply a matter of 
allowing the forces of supply and demand to establish an implicit set of market-clearing prices. 
There is no reason to suppose that, without Say’s Law, such a set of prices at all times 
necessarily exists.  
 
Current theoretical fashion 
 
The principal contemporary challenge to the Keynes theory comes from an old direction, from 
the resussitation, under the New Classical banner, of neoclassical employment theory of the pre-
Keynesian sort. This probably goes back to Phelps’ (1967) and Friedman’s (1968) 
reinterpretation, in the era of “stagflation”, of the (short-run) Phillips curve as showing 
employment changes as a function of price and wage changes, rather than vice versa. The thesis 
advanced by Phelps and Friedman was that the negatively-sloped Phillips curve relationship, as 
they interpreted it, obtained only in the short run on account of temporary misperceptions by the 
workforce about the real value of going money wages or on account of wage rigidity. It was 
argued that, in the longer term, with these disturbing factors absent, spending changes would 
have an effect only on prices and not on employment and output. From this treatment of prices, 
wages and employment the now-conventional macroeconomic aggregate supply (AS) curve was 
developed - the AS curve being shown as positively-sloped in the short run if wage rigidity or 
errors are taken to apply, and vertical in the long run when “proper” responses to demand 
disturbances are supposed to be made. 
 
This account of fluctuations in employment and output, told in terms of short and long run AS 
curves, is of course (no matter whether the particular story told is described as “New Classical” 
or “New Keynesian”) based on the old pre-Keynes conception that employment is determined in 
the labour market at the point of intersection of the labour demand (marginal product of labour) 
and labour supply schedules. From this perspective, variations in employment can occur in the 
short run only if conditions of labour supply alter (i.e. if the labour supply curve shifts); if these 
conditions do not change, then, no matter what happens to aggregate demand, employment and 
output will not be affected. Such a representation of the labour market has no room for the notion 
of involuntary unemployment, with labour “off its supply curve” on account of a deficiency of 
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demand for output. Likewise, the validity of this labour market model requires that Say’s Law 
holds good, as any increase in labour supply (rightward shift of the supply curve) must be 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in demand for output. Thus, the presently fashionable 
macroeconomic AS curve represents, without any doubt, a reversion to a pre-Keynes conception 
of the working of the labour market - exactly a la Professor Pigou. 
 
The other element of the current AD/AS model, the AD function, is, from a Keynesian 
viewpoint, equally suspect. The original proponents of a wealth / real-balance effect never 
pretended that a significant and reliable functional relationship existed between changes in the 
price level, particularly in the downward direction, and effective demand for output. It was 
viewed by them as of negligible practical significance. But nowadays, in the macro literature, the 
downward-sloping AD curve is presented, without qualification or reservation, as representing 
(just as reliably as the downward-sloping demand curve for an individual commodity) a 
relationship between the level of prices and aggregate demand. It doesn’t seem that those who 
make use of this function have considered, and found an answer to, the problems of which earlier 
writers were aware - it looks rather as if these once well-recognised difficulties with the AD 
function are simply ignored. Nevertheless, in contemporary neoclassical macro theory, this 
questionable AD curve (as a component of the AD/AS model) comes to represent the Keynesian 
contribution.13   
 
There is another point about the AD function which should be noted. AD as derived from IS/LM 
is not really a demand function at all: what it actually shows (putting aside the unconvincing 
nature of the postulated relationship) is a relationship between the price level and the equilibrium 
level of activity, rather than between price and demand). It has been suggested (Collander, 1995) 
that this function may more properly be designated an “aggregate equilibrium curve”, since it 
depicts possible states of macroeconomic equilibrium according to the level of prices, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
                                                 
13
 This suspect AD function may perhaps be considered an example of what Professor Joan Robinson would have 
called “bastard Keynesianism” 
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If we return to the neoclassical AS curve, it will be observed that it also, is, in effect, an 
“aggregate equilibrium curve”, as it too depicts possible price level output combinations at 
which the economy might be in equilibrium with aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply. 
(As the labour market model implies the validity of Say’s Law, it must be the case that for every 
price level, real wage rate, and state of labour supply represented along the curve, demand for 
output must be such as to justify that level of employment.) 
 
When the two curves are put together to form the standard AD/AS model14, we have a 
theoretical nonsense. Each curve in itself, being in its own terms an “aggregate equilibrium 
curve”, indicates an equilibrium state of the economy in terms of output and the price level. The 
two cannot be put together as one model - the fashionable AD/AS construction is in fact an 
illegitimate attempt to combine the incompatible. [On the rehabilitation of the neoclassical 
theory of employment and the deficiencies of the AD/AS model, see Grieve (1998).15]  
 
It is worth noting that the AD/AS hotchpotch has been equally condemned from a purist New 
Classical perspective. Thus Barro and Grilli (1994, p.428): 
 
The main problem with the AS-AD framework is that the various pieces of the model are contradictory. 
The AD curve reflects the underlying IS/LM model . . .  The AS curve assumes that producers (and 
workers) can sell their desired quantities at the going price, P. That is why the quantity supplied rises 
when P increases relative to Pe (the expected price level). This set-up is inconsistent with the Keynesian 
                                                 
14
  By the “standard” AD/AS model we mean the construction composed as described in the text. The label 
“AD/AS” is also applied (inappropriately) to other constructions of a superficially similar, but in reality very 
different character, in which the “AD” curve is understood to show a relationship between the price level and output 
and the “AS” curve depicts price changes per period of time as a function of the level of output. Such a model 
(which might more properly be described as an “AO/PP” – “output / price level model” – is free of the 
inconsistency of the standard AD/AS construction, and can provide a framework for analysis of inter-related 
changes in aggregate demand, output and prices.  
15
  Vide also Rao (1998) for various perspectives on the AD/AS model. 
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idea – present in the IS/LM model and therefore in the AD curve – that producers and workers are 
constrained by aggregate demand in their ability to sell goods and services. 
 
We find then the extraordinary situation that modern neoclassical macroeconomics is apparently 
content to employ a model which attempts to embody at the same time - as supposedly 
complementary elements - a “bastard” version of the Keynesian theory of demand and 
employment together with a representation of the “classical” theory of employment and output - 
the theory which was the specific target of Keynes’s attack in the General Theory. When it 
comes to interpretation of this mongrel construction, it is the pre-Keynesian element that in fact 
becomes dominant. The quasi-Keynesian component is essentially redundant when the model is 
used to present a story to the effect that if spending changes affect output and employment at all, 
they do so only if on the supply side of the labour market there is some “inappropriate” response 
to the disturbance; such deviations from the “natural rate of unemployment” are understood as 
transient and self-correcting, since misperceptions are soon corrected or wage rigidity relaxed. 
Whether the authors of such accounts realise it or not, they are to all intents and purposes 
repeating the standard pre-Keynesian account of cyclical fluctuations in employment. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It has been our purpose to question the common presumption that flexibility of wages and prices 
is enough to ensure (at least eventually) the attainment of full employment. Too little attention,  
we conclude, is paid to the possibility that, even with wage and price flexibility, such 
adjustments may be incapable of reconciling overall conditions of demand and supply so as to 
generate full employment. It may very well be the case, with savings and investment in a world 
of uncertainty, that, in given circumstances, no set of equilibrium prices actually exists to be 
found through the free functioning of the price mechanism: the problem is not that prices are 
inflexible but that the state of aggregate demand is incompatible with the conditions of labour 
supply. We suggest that the convention of taking it as “reasonable” to assume the existence of a 
set of equilibrium values ceases to be reasonable if the Walrasian general equilibrium approach 
is extended beyond its initial application in the case of consumers swapping goods on a desert 
island beach. In the real world, inflexibility in the downward direction of money wages and 
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prices may actually, as Keynes suggested, be viewed as beneficial, contributing to stability rather 
than inhibiting adjustment to full employment equilibrium. 
 
We note too it is unfortunate that much macroeconomic discussion is currently conducted in 
terms of a theoretical model which cannot but confuse. The the presently fashionable AD/AS 
model has rightly been condemned as a muddled hybrid which should have no place in macro 
analysis. The whole conception implies, in the macro context, an inappropriate analogy with 
microeconomic adjustment to equilibrium through short and long-run price changes. Each of the 
incompatible individual parts of the model involves unjustifiable assumptions about the benign 
consequences of price flexibility. On the AD side, all the reservations earlier expressed as to the 
necessarily positive effects of deflation on aggregate demand have apparently been forgotten – it 
is not that doubts on these matters have been answered, rather that the problems have been swept 
under the carpet, allowing the unqualified assertion that there exists a reliable inverse 
relationship between the price level and the volume of aggregate demand. On the AS side of the 
analysis, the essence of Keynes’s rejection of the “classical” theory – that unemployment in the 
labour market depends on the state of demand for output and not on the terms on which labour 
services are offered – is likewise overlooked: overlooked, it would seem, through want of 
understanding, rather than rejected on theoretical grounds. The conventional view, that is to say, 
whether offered under the “New Classical” or “New Keynesian” label, is that variations in 
employment occur only with changes in the effective conditions of labour supply. Thus the 
categories of unemployment recognised by the typical contemporary macro textbook are again, 
as in the pre-Keynesian era, restricted to frictional and perhaps voluntary: Keynes’s concept of 
involuntary unemployment has disappeared from view. The presumption that price flexibility 
ensures full employment turns the theoretical clock back seventy years.  
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